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Abstract 
 
This study achieved a group of objectives including the measuring of the impact of the 
EU’s decisions on trust-based, nationalism-based, and religion-based Euro-skepticism, 
as well as Euro-skepticism in general, by conducting content analysis of statements 
made by some elite members of a peripheral Turkish religious party, the Felicity Party 
(Saadet Partisi, SP).The hypotheses were tested at two independent events (one on 
December 17, 2004 and the other on October 03, 2005). The data were collected from 
the pro-SP Milli Gazete. Each hypothesis was tested by using the two sample z-Test 
formula. The findings show that the two decisions by the EU did not have any impact 
on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. Only the first event had an impact 
on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of the SP.  No positive impact was found at 
the 0.05 level. By the end of the second event, only trust-based Euro-skepticism of the 
SP showed a decrease at the 0.10 level. The results of this study were associated with 
social identity theory, with the group’s status as a peripheral party, and the policy 
requirements of the EU regarding Turkey’s sensitive issues. 
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Introduction 
 
  Turkey’s prospective EU membership has captured significant attention and 
sparked a serious debate in Europe for the past several years. In spite of Turkey’s large 
Muslim population, geographic size, level of economic development, and low per capita 
income (Grigoriadis, 2006) (none of which would appear to designate it as a prime 
candidate for EU membership), its unique geo-strategic position (at the crossroads of the 
Balkans, the wider Middle East, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and beyond); its 
importance to the security of Asia’s energy supply; and its political, economic, and 
military leverage (Laciner, Ozcan, & Bal, 2005) have made Turkey a candidate country 
that is different from all the others.  
  Supporters and critics of Turkey’s EU membership have both used Turkey’s 
Islamic religious and cultural identity, geographical position, demographic size, and level 
of economic development as arguments for and against Turkey’s EU membership. For 
example, the supporters of Turkey’s EU membership believe that not only would the 
admission of a Muslim country into the EU constitute the most effective guarantee that 
the EU would retain a secular, inclusive, and multicultural character, they believe it 
would also send a powerful message to the rest of the world (Grigoriadis, 2006). On the 
other hand, in the Declaration of the “No Turkish Membership in the EU” campaign, the 
opponents of Turkey’s EU membership argue that Turkey belongs to the East and Islam, 
not Europe. They assert, quite simply, that Turkey is not a European country, and, 
likewise, that the Orient and Islam are not part of Europe. These opponents go so far as to 
claim that most Europeans themselves do not want to have Turkish or Arab countries in 
the European Union, as the EU is not a union of all democracies, they say, nor is it only a 
union of values. They remind those who will listen that the EU is a European Union and 
that Turkey is culturally and historically not European. In their words, only the people of 
Europe can decide which countries are accepted as EU member nations, not politicians or 
foreigners (“Campaign against Turkish Membership”). Some of these opponents, 
however, do believe that a “special relationship” between Turkey and the EU would be 
desirable for strategic and economic reasons (Schauble, 2004). This “special relationship” 
might be defined as a sort of “privileged partnership” between Turkey and EU member 
nations, implying a close strategic, political, and economic relationship between Turkey 
and EU member nations but still falling short of full EU membership for Turkey. This 
possibility became very popular, especially among some political parties in Germany, 
Australia, and France that oppose full membership for Turkey. Underlying European 
fears, prejudices, and skepticism always seem to surface in the discussion of full EU 
membership for Turkey (Grigoriadis, 2006). This European rejectionism targeting Turkey 
can be observed among both elites and the common people of Europe (Yilmaz, 2004). 
After taking a glimpse at the European perception of Turkey’s prospective EU 
membership, it is relevant to look at the perception of Turkey about its own membership 
in the EU.  Journal of Global and International Studies 
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  Turkish public opinion is overwhelmingly in support of full EU membership, and 
enthusiasm among dominant groups is increasing. According to the Euro-barometer, 
Turkey is one of the highest-ranking countries in support of its own EU membership, 
with 65 percent in favor of the proposal (European Commission, 2002), and with 71 
percent of this sample believing that the country will benefit from such membership. 
There are many different studies that measure the attitudes of the Turkish public toward 
Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, drawing on pooled Eurobarometer data from 
2001, 2002, and 2003, one recent study examined the extent to which attachment to 
Islam, utilitarian considerations, and national identity explain individual support for 
Turkey’s accession to the EU in a possible membership referendum (Kentmen, 2008). 
The study revealed that (1) people evaluated accession on the basis of its influence on 
national identity and contributions to the national economy in Turkey and (2) attitudes 
toward the EU did not vary with one’s devotion to Islam. This finding implies that 
Islamic values are not incompatible with being part of the West and that attachment to 
Islam does not affect attitudes toward the West. According to several studies, mainly 
descriptive, the majority of Turkish political parties and elites are in favor of Turkey’s EU 
membership. The Euro-skeptic elites and parties are limited in number and have limited 
appeal to the Turkish public, but the ambivalent position of Europe and its Turkey-
skepticism harden them (Ayata, 2003). There is a lack of empirical research about the 
perceptions of Turkish political elites toward the European Union. Therefore, conducting 
an empirical study on the Euro-skepticism of a peripheral, religious Turkish party (the 
Felicity Party) makes my research valuable in that it will reduce the deficit in empirical 
research in this field. This study will measure the impact of the events of 17 December 
2004 and 3 October 2005 on trust-based and ideology-based (religion and nationalism) 
euro-skepticism specifically and on Euro-skepticism in general.  
  There have been some studies on party preferences of the individuals and how 
they relate to the support of or opposition to EU membership. For instance, among all 
major political parties, only the Pro-Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) has a 
majority of voters against full membership of Turkey in the EU. The SP’s major pro-
Islamist rival, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) has a 
small majority (52 percent) in favor of full EU membership. All other parties have a clear 
majority of voters in favor of Turkey’s EU membership. It is interesting that the highest 
level of EU support comes from the constituents of Kurdish HADEP, which was banned 
in 2003. Despite much open opposition by the party elite, 68 percent of the Nationalist 
Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) supporters are also in clear support of the 
EU membership (Carkoglu, 2003).  
The main reason for the opposition to Turkey’s EU membership by Felicity Party 
(Saadet Partisi, SP) elites is Euro-skepticism. Euro-skepticism is rooted in distrust of the 
EU, nationalism, and religion-based concerns in Turkey. That is why, as a religiously 
affiliated party, the Felicity Party shows a clearer skepticism toward the EU than the other 
political parties do. The fear that European integration could possibly erode national 
sovereignty and dilute Turkish-Islamic identity and culture forms this party’s skepticism 
toward EU integration (Arikan, 2004). By looking at the results of the research, however, Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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we can see that while there is not a clear correlation between party preference and support 
of or opposition to EU integration in some cases, there is precisely such a correlation in 
others.  For example, even though MHP leadership has shown a strong resistance to EU 
integration, 68 percent of its constituents have supported Turkey’s EU membership. On 
the other hand, AKP is the leader of Turkey’s EU integration process, but only 52 percent 
of its constituents support full EU membership for Turkey. This correlation is clearer in 
the case of other parties. For instance, the SP shows a strong resistance against the EU, 
and the majority of its constituents show resistance as well.   
  Despite exceptions such as the MHP and its followers, a direct relationship exists 
between Turkish individuals’ party preferences and their support or resistance of 
Turkey’s EU membership. Each party has a certain number of supporters, and the way 
each political party thinks and operates can easily affect the beliefs of its followers. 
Indeed, parties may play an important role in affecting society’s opinion about the 
Integration of Turkey in the EU. For this reason, the resistance of any party to Turkey’s 
EU membership is important enough to merit close examination since it might create a 
much more complex integration process in the European Union. 
From a policy perspective, there exist many so-called “sensitive” issues that can 
easily be used by the political parties that oppose Turkey’s EU membership. These issues, 
when publicly expressed, are easily exploited by such parties and used to stir up support 
from Euro-skeptics, using nationalistic and religious rhetoric to build opposition to EU 
membership within the largely EU-supportive Turkish public. The choice of rhetoric of 
political parties may significantly influence the level of support or opposition of the 
public with respect to full membership of Turkey in the EU. In light of this, despite the 
majority of public support for Turkey’s EU membership within Turkey, the polarized and 
publicly proclaimed resistance to EU-membership of some Turkish elites (and their 
primary political parties) can manipulate the public opinion. Indeed, “segments within the 
political elite can easily accomplish their objective of melting mass support for EU 
membership by providing misinformation to the public and strategically shaping the 
rhetoric around the sensitive issues” (Carkoglu, 2003).   One such example of a “sensitive 
issue” involves the cultural rights of the citizens of Kurdish origin and the abolition of the 
death penalty. The death penalty is linked to the Kurdish issue due to the fact that 
Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, was on death row.   
  Therefore, in this study, the relationship will be looked at from the perspective of 
political parties and their relationship to the support or opposition of Turkey’s EU 
membership. While there have been previous studies on the party preferences of 
constituencies and support or opposition for EU membership, the perspective in this 
particular study is from the political parties’ standpoint rather than that of party 
constituencies. The main reason that some political parties resist EU integration is 
because of the various forms of Euro-skepticism that they harbor. There are different 
reasons for Euro-skepticism, and this study will attempt to explain these reasons and 
measure whether the decisions of the EU itself regarding Turkey’s EU membership have 
had any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites. Events 
occurring on December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005 will be used as to measure the Journal of Global and International Studies 
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impact of the decisions of the EU on Turkey’s own support of or opposition to its EU 
membership.  
Islamist Parties and the Felicity Party 
 
Until the late 1990s, Turkey’s Islamist Parties were radically opposed to EU 
membership for Turkey. According to Professor Erbakan, who was the leader of the 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) at that time and who is now the informal leader of the 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), the “EU is a Christian Club, established to prove that the 
cross was superior to the crescent.” In his book, “The Basic Problems of Turkey,” he 
said: “I regard the application of Turkey for the full membership in the EC as treason to 
our history, civilization, culture, and sovereignty” (Erbakan, 1991).  
The Islamist Welfare Party, however, was first ousted and then outlawed by the 
Constitutional Court in 1998. At that time, the Welfare Party’s elite founded the Virtue 
Party (Fazilet Partisi) and made several changes in political policy on a number of issues. 
Democracy, human rights, and freedom were then emphasized by the party elites, one of 
the results of which was that the former Welfare Party’s hostile stance on Turkish 
membership in the European Union was softened. In fact, the new leader of the Virtue 
Party, Recai Kutan, declared that the new party would have a new image. He even 
stressed the importance of Turkey’s EU membership and talked about the universal 
values of Europe without any indication of the Welfare Party’s previously strongly anti-
Western position (Unal, 1998). Despite this, the state prosecutor who had applied to the 
Constitutional Court for the Welfare Party’s closure declared  publicly that because the 
new Virtue Party was the official successor to the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), it, too, 
would be banned (Taniyici, 2003). When the Virtue Party was banned by the 
Constitutional Court in June 2001, its elites split and founded two different parties: the 
Saadet Partisi (SP), (the Felicity Party) and the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) (the 
Justice and Development Party). Both parties assumed a positive stance toward the EU, 
especially the AKP, which became a leader within Turkey’s EU- membership project 
(Taniyici, 2003).  
Despite their previous resistance to EU-membership, the following events 
precipitated a change in the Islamists’ stance on proposed membership. The first was the 
ban on headscarves, and the second was the closure of political parties, especially Islamist 
Parties, by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the influence of the military over civilian 
governments. Islamist political elites started seeing the EU as a solution to these 
concerns. They believed that the ban on headscarves might be lifted with the help of the 
libertarian rules, views, and policies of the EU. They also believed that criticism from the 
EU would stop the Turkish Constitutional Court from disbanding Islamist political 
parties. Their hopes were not unfounded. For example, the EU president stated that the 
EU “notes with regret the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on 16 January 
1998 to order the closure of the Welfare Party, to confiscate its property, and to ban 
certain present and former members of that party from being members of the Turkish 
Parliament or from further political activity for five years” (Bulletin of the European 
Union, 1998). The elite from the Virtue Party, in particular, came to the conclusion that Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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Western democracy would provide a solution to these problems when Turkey became a 
member of the EU. As such, argues Ayata (2003), this radical shift in Islamist party 
ideology was born of necessity.  
As previously described, when the Virtue Party was banned by the Constitutional 
Court, the elites of this party split and founded both the AKP (Justice and Development 
Party) and the SP (Felicity Party). After the election of 2002, the AKP, as a ruling party, 
continued supporting Turkey’s EU membership. However, the Felicity Party’s stance 
toward Turkey’s EU membership started to change drastically after the election of 2002. 
This change was the result of several factors. First, the election of 2002 had, as a result of 
the court-ordered disbanding of the Virtue Party, relegated members of the newly 
founded Felicity Party to the periphery. On top of this, SP party members’ perspectives 
on Western democracy and EU-membership were done no favors when the EU was not 
able to stop the Turkish Constitutional Court from closing the Islamic Virtue Party. 
Indeed, in February 13, 2003, when the European Court of Human Rights  ruled that the 
Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision to ban the Welfare Party had not violated human 
rights laws (Taniyici, 2003), Felicity Party members were greatly disappointed. Finally, 
the EU also did not provide any solution to the headscarves restrictions. In fact, in 2005, 
the European Court of Human Rights upheld Turkey’s ruling against a young woman 
who had taken the Turkish State to the court because she had been expelled from the 
University of Istanbul for refusing to take off the scarf in class (Financial Times Special 
Report, 2006). The court rejected the appeal by Leyla Sahin, who argued that the state 
ban violated her right to an education and discriminated against her. The verdict was a 
bitter shock for the public, especially the Islamist elite. After this court ruling on the 
banning of headscarves, they more clearly understood what the EU could and could not 
offer to Turkey.  
 
Methodology 
 
This study investigated whether the decisions of the EU toward Turkey’s EU 
membership have had any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political 
elites. Events on December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005 were used to measure this 
possible impact on a major religious party, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). 
A content analysis method was used in this study. The changes in the content and 
occurrences of this conservative party’s statements on trust-based and ideology- based 
Euro-skepticism were analyzed over time.  Two major EU decisions about Turkey’s 
membership were selected as critical discourse moments around which to analyze the 
possible attitude changes of the Felicity Party with respect to Turkey’s EU membership 
over time, particularly in reference to before, during, and after these two events. Both 
latent and manifest content analyses of this party’s official statements were employed to 
understand the impact of the EU’s decisions on the Euro-skepticism of this political party. Journal of Global and International Studies 
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Research Questions 
 
Specific 
 
1.  Does Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership project (specifically reflected in 
the events of the December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005) have any impact on the 
Euro-skepticism (trust-based, nationalism-based and religion-based) of the Felicity 
Party’s elites? 
 
General 
 
2.  Do the decisions of the EU with respect to Turkey’s EU membership have any impact 
on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites? 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent variable  
 
Euro-skepticism (whether the result of trust-based, Nationalism-based, or Religion-based 
concerns) 
 
Independent variable 
 
The decisions of the EU regarding Turkey’s EU membership on 17 December, 2004 and 
on 03 October, 2005 
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Figure 1: Operationalization of Euro-skepticism 
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(The fear of losing                 (The fear of losing  
national values and                religious values) 
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Figure 2: Operationalization of the Decisions of the EU 
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                               The Decisions that were made by EU Political Elites  
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91 
 
 
The Importance of Two Major Events 
 
  Essentially, 17 December 2004 is the date on which the European Union approved 
Turkey’s completion of Copenhagen criteria, and the European Council decided to open 
talks regarding Turkey’s accession to the European Union on 3 October 2005, though 
with strings attached. The second date, 3 October 2005, is the date on which the accession 
talks with Turkey symbolically opened, as was promised on 17 December 2004. 
 
Timetable 
 
The timetable begins on July 25, 2004 and end on February 25, 2006, examining 
145 days before and after each major event. In this way, I ensure that no important data 
between July25, 2004 and February 25, 2006 remains unexamined. By recording data 
from 145 days before and after each major event, I maintain consistency in my research.    
 
The timetable was established as follows: 
 
General Period for the December 17, 2004 event: 
 
Before the decision: July 25, 2004 – December 16, 2004 
 
During the decision: December 17, 2004 
 
After the decision: December 18, 2004 – May 10, 2005 
 
General Period for the October 03, 2005 event: 
 
Before the decision: May 11, 2005 – October 02, 2005 
 
During the decision: October 03, 2005 
 
After the decision: October 04, 2005 – February 25, 2006 
 
Data Collection 
The data was collected from a Pro-SP newspaper, the Milli Gazete. By doing a 
content analysis, I looked at the frequency and content of the party’s statements about the 
EU. The frequency of these statements was indicated as a percentage of all statements 
about the EU made by the party.  Since I am measuring Euro-skepticism, my main focus 
was on the negative statements made by the party about the EU. However, to see a 
broader picture and to increase the reliability of the study, I have paid attention on the 
positive, neutral, and ambiguous EU statements as well. The technique of content analysis 
helped me to classify and analyze party’s statements and statement strategies. They were Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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classified as negative (nationalism-based, religion-based, trust-based and other negatives), 
neutral, positive, and ambiguous statements.   
  
Sampling Frame 
  
  Since this study focuses on the party elites of the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, 
SP), my population of interest was the Central Office. Each reachable individual of the 
Central Office was also a part of the sample of this study. The Central Office is the main 
decision-making mechanism of the party, and all the other organs of the party must obey 
the rules, regulations, decisions, and instructions of the Central Office. Basically, the 
Central Office consists of the party elites.  
 
The Organizational Structure of the Party 
The Organizational Structure is comprised of three different Organs which 
include: 
(1)- Primary Organs (Main Organization), (2)- Supplementary Organs, and (3)- Agencies 
at Home and Abroad. This research focused only on the Central Office from the Primary 
Organs (Main Organization). Therefore, it can be easily said that the Central Office is the 
most representative organ of the entire Party as a whole. The list of the names and 
positions can be seen from Appendix A in my dissertation and on the official web page of 
the political party, www.sp.org.tr/ (Official Web Page of SP). 
 
Coding 
 
  The data was coded as follows: The method of content analysis helped me to 
identify the negative (religious, nationalistic, trust-based, and other negatives), positive, 
neutral, and ambiguous statements from the texts.  
  
Column A 
 
The statements (observations) made by the party about the EU were entered into SPSS 
and numerated under the “TypeofStatement” (Column A). This first column was used to 
code each statement as a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. The statements (the first four of which 
represent negative statements made by the party about the EU) were coded as follows: 
Religion = 1, Nationalism = 2, Trust = 3, Other Negatives = 4, Neutral = 5, Positive = 6, 
and Ambiguous = 7. 
 
Column B 
 
Column B displays the date (month/day/year) of each statement and helps to mark the 
time that each statement was said or implemented. 
 Journal of Global and International Studies 
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Column C 
 
Column C displays the before, during, and after of each event as follows: Before the first 
event = 1, During the first event = 2, After the first event = 3, Before the second event = 
4, During the second event= 5, and After the second event = 6. 
    
Column D 
 
Column D represents the political party, and SP was coded as 1. 
    
Column E 
 
Column E displays the official level, and two different levels were observed under this 
column. The leader of the party was coded as 1, and the other elites around the party 
leader were coded as 2. 
 
Column F 
 
The final Column F contains the type data. Basically, it indicates how the views of the 
party elite were distributed. The Press Briefings were coded as 1, the speeches and 
messages were coded as 2, and if the data type was undetermined it was coded as 3. 
 
Coding Rules for the Column A. 
    
   Religion=1 
 
    The statement is coded as (1) Religion if the statement delivers a message that EU 
membership will harm Turkey’s Islamic values, Islamic Identity, or Islamic culture and 
expresses that the EU is a Christian club, anti-Muslim and anti-Islam, or, if the statement 
delivers a message that disagrees with existing and many proposed future issues 
regarding Islam (religion). Support of D-8 was also considered as opposition to the EU as 
a “Christian Club.”  
 
    Nationalism=2 
 
    The statement is coded as (2) Nationalism if (a) the statement delivers a message 
that EU membership will harm Turkey’s national values, national identity, national 
culture, national interest, national sovereignty, nation state, national unity, state entirety, 
state dignity or expresses that the EU is anti-Turkish and an external enemy, or (b) if the 
statement delivers a message that disagrees with existing and many proposed future 
issues regarding nationalism. 
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   Trust=3 
 
   The statement is coded as (3) Trust if the statement expresses any doubt about the 
EU’s willingness and honesty in accepting Turkey as a member, or any distrust of the EU 
and the EU’s double standards towards Turkey. 
 
   Other Negatives=4 
  
   The statement is coded as (4) Other Negatives if the statement delivers any 
message that is (a) neither Religion-based, Nationalism-based, nor Trust-based Euro-
skepticism related, or, (b) if the statement is a combination of Religion-based, 
Nationalism-based, and Trust-based Euro-skepticism, or (c) if there is more than one 
meaning.  
 
   Neutral=5 
 
   The statement is coded as (5) Neutral if the statement delivers any message that is 
neither negative nor positive nor ambiguous. 
    
   Positive=6 
 
    The statement is coded (6) Positive if the statement delivers any message that is 
positive about the EU.  
 
    Ambiguous=7 
 
    The statement is coded as (7) ambiguous if (a) the statement is open to two or 
more interpretations or has more than one possible meaning, so that it is not clear how the 
sentence will be coded, or (b) if the statement is neither negative nor neutral nor positive. 
 
Reliability of the Study 
    
   At the end of the coding of each of the related statements made about the EU, 50 
randomly selected statements were coded by two independent coders. The results were 
compared with the original coding to determine the reliability of this research. Since three 
observers (the researcher and two independent coders) were involved in this research, 
Inter-Rater (Inter-Observer or Inter-Coder) Reliability is the best technique to assess the 
degree to which different raters/observers give consistent estimates of the same 
phenomenon. Inter-rater reliability is the commonly used term for the extent to which 
independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same 
conclusion (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, & Bracken, 2004). Tinsley and Weiss (1975, 2000) 
indicate that inter-coder (inter-rater) agreement is the most specific term for the type of 
consistency required in content analysis. Kolbe and Burnett (1991) note that “inter-judge Journal of Global and International Studies 
95 
 
 
reliability is often perceived as the standard measure of research quality. High levels of 
disagreement among judges suggest weaknesses in research methods, including the 
possibility of poor operational definitions, categories, and judge trainings.” Additionally, 
“coefficients of .90 or greater are nearly always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable in 
most situations, and .70 may be appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices. 
Higher criteria should be used for indices known to be liberal (i.e., percent agreement) 
and lower criteria should be used for indices known to be more conservative” (Cohen’s 
Kappa, Scott’s pi, and Krippendorff’s alpha) (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, & Bracken, 
2004). Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that kappa values from 0.41-0.60 are moderate, 
and those values above 0.60 are substantial. Kappa is a useful statistic when one is 
concerned that the percent agreement might be artificially inflated because of the fact that 
most observations fall into a single category (Stemler, 2004). 
 
Table 1: Agreement between Researcher and Coder1 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error(a)  Approx. T(b)  Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement  Kappa 
N of Valid Cases  
.864 
50 
.057 11.294  .000 
 
Table 2: Agreement Between Researcher and Coder2 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error(a)  Approx. T(b)  Approx. Sig. 
Measure of Agreement  Kappa 
N of Valid Cases 
.837 
50 
.061 11.094  .000 
Since the results are .86 and .83, we can say that this study is reliable. Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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Hypotheses Testing 
 
The hypotheses were tested by using Two Sample Z-Test to compare Two  
Independent Proportions.  The formula is as follows: 
 
  P1 – P2 
 
Z=  
 
          [PC (1 – PC ) / n1 ] + [PC (1 – PC )/ n2 ] 
 
(Hawkes, Marsh, 2005) 
 
P1 = X1 / n1 
 
P2 = X2 / n2 
 
Pc = (X1 + X2) / (n1 + n2)  
 
If Z is 1.96 or higher, then the difference of means is significant at the .05 level. In that  
case, the null hypotheses were rejected (Zhou, Fielding, Silverman, Tempany, 2003). 
 
Main Hypotheses 
 
 H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism; H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to 
Turkey’s EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism; 
H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have any 
impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism; and H4_The decisions of the EU in regards to 
Turkey’s EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical 
Turkish political elites.  
  Each of these hypotheses will be tested based on a party (SP), and each major 
decision from the EU (17 December, 2004 and 3 October, 2005).  
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Results 
Hypotheses Testing for SP 
 
 
Table 3: Types of Statements: Before, during and after each event Crosstabulation (SP) 
 
Before, During, And After Each Event 
Types of 
Statements 
Before 
1st 
Event 
During 
1st 
Event 
After 
1st 
Event 
Before 
2nd 
Event 
During 
2nd 
Event 
After 
2nd 
Event 
Total 
Religion  43 0 58  35 0 37  173 
Nationalism  133 0 199  127 1  99  559 
Trust  54 1 45  53 1 34  188 
Other Negatives  111  1 89  53 4 80  338 
Neutral  46 3 29  17 0 24  119 
Positive  4 0 2 0 0 0 6 
Ambiguous  54 0 71  42 2 29  198 
Total  445 5 493  327 8 303  1581 
 
The appropriate numbers are inserted into the two sample z-Test formula. If z is 
1.96 or higher, then the difference of means is significant at the .05 level. In that case, the 
null hypotheses will be rejected. 
 
Two Sample Z-Test Formula: 
 
   
P1 = X1 / n1 
 
P2 = X2 / n2 
 
Pc = (X1 + X2) / (n1 + n2)    or,  
 
(Hawkes, Marsh, 2005) 
 
 
 
Table 4: Hypothesis Testing for Felicity Party (SP) 
 
                               Hypothesis Testing for Felicity Party (SP)
First Event   Second Event 
H1          
 
 P1 = 54/445= 0.121 
       
 P2 = 45/493= 0.091      
H1  
 
P1= 53/327= 0.162       
 
P2 = 34/303= 0.112      
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 Pc = (54+45)/ (445+493) = 99/938= 0.105 
 
 z = -1.496 
 
 Pc = (53+34)/ (327+303) = 87/630= 0.138 
 
 z = 1.812 
H2         
 
P1 = 133/445= 0.298 
       
 P2 = 199/493= 0.403      
  
Pc = (133+199)/ (445+493)= 332/938= 0.353 
 
z = -3.350 
H2  
            
 P1 = 127/327= 0.388       
  
 P2 = 99/303= 0.326      
  
Pc = (127+99)/ (327+303) = 226/630= 0.358 
 
z = 1.611 
H3    
 
P1 = 43/445= 0.096 
       
 P2= 58/493= 0.117      
 
Pc = (133+199)/ (445+493)= 332/938= 0.107 
 
z = -1.036 
H3  
             
P1 = 35/327= 0.107       
 
P2 = 37/303= 0.122      
 
 Pc = (35+37)/ (327+303) = 72/630= 0.114 
 
 z = -0.594 
H4     
              
P1 = 341/445= 0.776 
       
P2 = 391/493= 0.793      
  
Pc = (341+391)/ (445+493)= 732/938= 0.780 
 
z = -0.990 
H4      
 
P1 = 268/327= 0.819     
          
P2 = 250/303= 0.825      
               
Pc = (268+250)/ (327+303) = 518/630= 0.822 
 
z = -0.180 
 
For the First Event 
  H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism. Since z is -1.496 and lower than 1.96 (two 
tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null 
hypothesis will be accepted.   
  H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism. Since z is -3.350 and higher than 1.96 
(two tailed test), the difference of means is significant at the .05 level, and thus the null 
hypothesis will be rejected (Euro-skepticism increased). 
  H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism. Since z is -1.036 and lower than 1.96 (two 
tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null 
hypothesis will be accepted. Journal of Global and International Studies 
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  H4_The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites. Since z is -0.990 
and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 
level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted. 
 
For the Second Event 
  H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism. Since z is 1.812 and lower than 1.96 (two 
tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null 
hypothesis will be accepted. (It is significant at the 0.10 level, 1.64 and therefore there is 
a decrease in Trust-based Euro-skepticism). 
H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have  
any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism. Since z is 1.611 and lower than 1.96 
(two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null 
hypothesis will be accepted. 
  H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism. Since z is -0.594 and lower than 1.96 (two 
tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null 
hypothesis will be accepted. 
  H4_The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey’s EU membership do not have 
any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites. Since z is -0.180 
and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 
level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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Explanation of the Descriptive Parts of SPSS Sheets. 
 
SP-Frequencies 
 
Table 5: Frequency Table of Types of Statements (SP) 
  Frequency  Percent  Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Religion  173 10.9  10.9  10.9 
Nationalism  559 35.4  35.4  46.3 
Trust  188 11.9  11.9  58.2 
Other Negatives  338 21.4  21.4  79.6 
Neutral  119 7.5  7.5 87.1 
Positive  6 0.4  0.4  87.5 
Ambiguous  198 12.5  12.5  100 
Total  1581 100  100    
 
Figure 3: Types of Statements (SP)  
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  Even though the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) is a Turkish Political Party with a 
strong Islamist view, the religion-based statements made by the party regarding EU 
membership are much less frequent than the nationalism-based statements (10.9% and 
35.4%, respectively). After the closure of two Islamist parties, the Welfare Party and the 
Virtue Party, by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001, the Felicity Party made 
several changes in their policy on different issues. This intentional change in policy 
could easily be one of the reasons why the party elites of SP appeared to avoid making 
religion-based comments and instead made more made nationalism-based criticism 
regarding Turkey’s relationship with the European Union. Like the Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP), the Felicity Party (SP) also shows no sympathy toward the EU. In fact, 
the SP party uttered the smallest percentage (.4%) of positive statements with respect to 
Turkey’s EU membership, which appears to illustrate the party elites’ clear skepticism 
toward Turkey’s EU membership process. The party’s skepticism is further illustrated 
by the many statements made that demonstrate the party’s trust-based, nationalism-
based, religion-based concerns regarding EU membership and general Euro-skepticism. 
For instance, one of the party officials bitterly predicted that the “EU will never give 
Turkey a date to start full membership negotiations” Milli Gazete, (2004a). Another 
party official concurred, saying, the “EU will not give us a date in December” Milli 
Gazete, (2004b). Several hundred similar statements from the SP party elite show their 
different types of skepticism towards the EU.Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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Table 6: Before, during and after each event (SP) 
  Frequency  Percent  Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Before 1st Event  445 28.1  28.1  28.1 
During 1st Event  5 0.3  0.3  28.5 
After 1st Event  493 31.2  31.2  59.6 
Before 2nd Event  327 20.7  20.7  80.3 
During 2nd Event  8 0.5  0.5  80.8 
After 2nd Event  303 19.2  19.2  100 
Total  1581 100  100    
 
Figure 4: Before, during and after each event (SP) 
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The results of the data show that the SP was more affected by the first event, on 
December 17, 2004, than by the second, on October 3, 2005. The figures above illustrate 
that the number of statements made by the SP party decreases with the second event. If 
we look at Table 3, we see that the number of nationalism-based statements made by the 
SP for the first event is 332. This number decreased to 226 for the second event. This 
decrease may either be due to a general decrease in the party elite’s Euro-skepticism, or it 
may simply reflect the party elites’ decision to stop speaking publicly about the EU. To 
determine which might be the case, we must look at the positive statements made by 
party members. If, while nationalism-based negative statements decrease, there is no 
concurrent increase in positive statements made, it is hard to say definitively that Euro-
skepticism is decreasing. Instead, the apparent decline in skepticism might more 
accurately reflect the party elites’ decision simply not to talk about the EU anymore.  
  
Table 7: The level of party official (SP) 
  Frequency  Percent  Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Leader  494 31.2  31.2  31.2 
Other Elites  1087 68.8  68.8 100 
Total  1581 100  100    
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Figure 5: The level of party official (SP) 
 
 
 
 
The SP’s statements came more from party elites than from the party leader. The 
leader of the party has made fewer comments about the EU compared to the other elites. 
(68.8% vs. 31.2%).  
 
Table 8: The data type (SP) 
  Frequency  Percent  Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Press Briefings  594 37.6  37.6  37.6 
Speeches and Messages  818 51.7  51.7  89.3 
Undetermined  169 10.7  10.7  100 
Total  1581 100  100    
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Figure 6: the data type (SP) 
 
 
The SP mostly used speeches and messages to deliver their opinion about the European 
Union. Press briefings were secondary to public statements made by these party elites. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
  The findings of this study show that the two decisions made by the EU (on 
December 17, 2004 and October 5, 2005) did not have any impact on the Felicity Party’s 
religion-based or trust-based Euro-skepticism. The findings also show that only the first 
event had an impact on the Felicity Party’s nationalism-based Euro-skepticism. The 
hypotheses tested in this study were conducted on one party and on two different events 
(including time both before and after each event). Since there were 4 general hypotheses, 
the total hypotheses testing occurred 8 times. The findings show that 1 of instances of 
hypotheses testing had a negative impact, and 7 instances of testing had no impact at all. 
No positive impact was found at the 0.05 level. Only one of hypothesis test showed 
significance at the 0.10 level. The results of all testing showed that the two decisions of 
the European Union either did not change the Felicity Party’s Euro-skepticism or that the 
party’s Euro-skepticism was changed in a negative way. None of the tests showed a 
data type
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positive impact or decrease in Euro-skepticism (even though the actions of the EU on 
both dates tested appeared to be positive). Why, then, didn’t the two events have any 
positive impact on the Felicity Party’s Euro-skepticism?   
The first answer to the question can be associated with the Social Identity Theory. 
Group membership creates in-group/self-categorization and enhancement in ways that 
favor the in-group at the expense of the out-group (TCW, 2004). “Minimal Group 
Studies” conducted by Tajfel and Turner (1986) showed that the mere act of individuals 
categorizing themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-
group favoritism. After they categorize themselves as group members, individuals seek to 
create positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from an out-group 
on some valued dimension.  This theory was developed in response to several 
experiments conducted by Tajfel and his colleagues demonstrating that individuals 
attempt to maximize the differences between their group and other groups, even at the 
cost of in-group rewards (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Billing, 1974; Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & 
Flament, 1971). Social Identity Theory (SIT) is based on the assumption that inter-group 
perceptions and conflicts arise because groups attempt to maintain distinctiveness from 
other groups (Cable, Welbourne, 1994). As such, regardless of whether the decisions of 
the EU may be externally perceived as positive, if members of the Felicity Party seek to 
maintain an identity that is distinct from European groups, and if the party seeks to 
maximize differences between their group and Europe (and by extension, the EU) by 
making statements that invoke concern that the EU is in fact discriminatory or prejudiced 
(against Turkey, its citizens, or its religious practices), the favorable decisions of the EU 
will not matter and will result in no decrease in Euro-skepticism within the Felicity Party.   
Since its inception, Social Identity Theory has mainly focused on inter-group 
phenomena in the context of large scale social categories and demographic groups. It has 
paid less attention to small groups and intra-group phenomena. In the last ten years, this 
has changed, and social identity researchers have increasingly applied the principles of 
SIT to organizational contexts (Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001). Specifically, SIT has been 
applied to a wide range of fields at the national and organizational levels, but there is still 
a lack of research that applies this theory at the inter-national level.  
The application of this theory to national (SP) and supra-national (EU) 
organizations is one of the unique features of this research. Like Flockhart’s (2005) 
study, my study is an example of inter-group phenomena in the context of large scale 
social categories and demographic groups. Flockhart explains why Europeanization is so 
differently perceived by masses than it is by the elites in Denmark. Flockhart writes, “The 
explanation is based on a conceptualization of mass and elite as two distinct social 
groups, which have been differently constructed, and which are undergoing different self-
and other categorization processes, leading to very different conceptions of interest and 
political preferences, and hence different views on the desirability of Europeanization” 
(Flockhart, 2005).  
In my study, if the reason why the EU’s favorable decisions did not decrease 
Euro-skepticism within the Felicity Party is indeed the result of an in-group vs. out-group 
phenomenon, then the case of the Felicity Party (SP) vs. European Union (EU) helps us 
to understand how the Social Identity Theory might be applied with respect to inter-group 
discrimination and how it might create serious international problems. In other words, if Journal of Global and International Studies 
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SIT helps to answer the question of why the EU’s positive actions did not decrease Euro-
skepticism within the Felicity Party, then we can conclude that this study applied Social 
Identity Theory on an inter-group phenomenon at the international level. The results of 
this study show that even though the decisions from the EU were positive, they either did 
not decrease Euro-skepticism or they changed the party elites’ Euro-skepticism in a 
negative way. Therefore, we can conclude that like the other studies related to Social 
Identity Theory, inter-group relationships at the international level play out very much 
the way they do at the inter-group level. Laboratory studies that use SIT’s minimal group 
paradigm have demonstrated that simply assigning an individual to a group is sufficient 
to generate in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Even explicitly random 
assignment of individuals to different groups has caused discrimination against out-
groups and increased intra-group cooperation and cohesion (Billing, Tajfel, 1973; 
Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980).  
Apart from Social Identity Theory altogether, the second reason why the EU’s 
decisions may not have reduced Euro-skepticism among SP party members could be 
associated with the fact that the Felicity Party is a peripheral party in Turkey. (The SP 
was a peripheral party at the time that this study was conducted, and it is still peripheral.) 
Conducting research on a peripheral party is another contribution of this study. By 
studying a peripheral party, an opportunity is created to compare and contrast the findings 
of this study with a similar study that was conducted on Turkey’s core parties (Arikan, 
2004) and to show how this more radical, peripheral party responded to the possibility of 
Turkey’s EU membership both (a) when it was a core party (before the Constitutional 
Court had disbanded its previous incarnation, the Virtue Party) and (b) in its now more 
peripheral incarnation. As the literature review confirms, core political parties with a role 
in governance seldom embrace Euro-skeptic positions. In the first place, such parties are, 
in effect, charged with bringing their countries into compliance with the acquis and 
cannot undermine the prevailing consensus on the “return to Europe.” Furthermore, 
parties in power are responsible for the continuation and implementation of the reform 
package that involves unpopular social and economic policies, so that the conditionality 
associated with accession has an instrumental value as justification for the reform 
(Hughes, Sasse, & Gordon, 2002). 
Parties in opposition, on the other hand, appear to have more incentives to 
articulate Euro-skeptic views as a means of differentiating themselves within the political 
sphere itself and making inroads into the competition for power (Bielasiak, 2004).  
Eventually, the anti-Europe position is most frequently advanced by peripheral parties, 
who aim to position themselves closer to the core of political power (and further from the 
periphery) specifically by differentiating themselves from core parties’ policies and 
public statements.  
By applying this theory to Turkey’s three types of political parties discussed 
earlier, it becomes evident that the level of Euro-skepticism gradually increases as the 
parties’ centrality decreases, going from ruling parties (lowest level) to opposition parties 
to peripheral parties (highest level). In other words, parties closer to the government tend 
to soften their positions toward Europe, leaving Euro-skepticism to those that are 
peripheral to the party system. As the literature review confirms, the reason why there 
was no apparent decrease in the Euro-skepticism of the Felicity Party elites might be 
associated with the peripheral status of their political party.  Impact of EU’S Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, 
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  A similar study to this one, conducted by Arikan (2004), found that both 
fundamental nationalist and religious parties in Turkey are in support of Turkey’s EU 
membership when they are core parties. Arikan’s study showed that these fundamental 
parties demonstrated a positive reaction to two different critical events, and both of these 
events possibly played a key role in increasing the overall percentage of pro-EU framings 
in both parties (as opposed to their anti-EU framings). The results of my study are in 
complete opposition to those of Arikan’s study, which may be a function of the Felicity 
Party’s status as a peripheral party. The number of positive statements made by the 
Felicity Party with respect to Turkey’s EU membership coded in my study shows that 
there is no support for the EU at all within the Felicity Party. Specifically, the findings of 
this study show that the percentage of positive statements made by the SP about the EU 
was only 0.4 percent, which can be seen from the frequency tables for “types of 
statements” of the party.  This is a clear proof that the discourse of a core, fundamental 
party (like the former Virtue Party) changes considerably as the party becomes more 
peripheral (like the current Felicity Party).  
  To return to more core status, the SP may have been using Turkey’s EU 
membership as a political tool to manipulate public opinion and regain party popularity in 
the years leading up to the 2007 national election. This party may also have been 
differentiating themselves from and targeting core parties such as the AKP by criticizing 
that party’s way of handling Turkey’s EU membership process. If this were the case, the 
SP might have believed that such tactics could cast doubt on the success of the current 
government, thereby giving the SP a chance to defend itself and influence the Turkish 
public against the AKP administration. This explanation of Peripheral Parties vs. Core 
Parties also nicely parallels the Social Identity Theory’s In-group vs. Out-group 
paradigm. 
  The third and final reason why the EU’s positive actions with respect to Turkey 
failed to reduce Euro-skepticism among Felicity Party elites may be explained by 
associating the findings of this study with the EU’s policies with respect to Turkey 
themselves. The results of this study may not be associated only with the Social Identity 
Theory or with a group’s status as a peripheral party. The policy requirements of the EU 
regarding Turkey and the sensitive nature of these issues may be the real reason why 
there was not a positive change in the Euro-skepticism of the Felicity Party’s elites. 
Simply put, the party elites might have had serious concerns about the future of Turkey, 
and the EU’s membership requirements with respect to some sensitive issues might have 
maintained or even increased the party’s Euro-skepticism.  The content analysis of the 
study coded the nature of all statements made by Felicity Party elites showing Euro-
skepticism. A total of 1581 statements made by the SP about the EU and the EU’s Policy 
towards Turkey were found. Most of these statements are negative. The following 
concerns of the Felicity Party elites are likely responsible in no small way for increased 
Euro-skepticism toward the EU: (1) the Cyprus issue, (including recognition of southern 
Cyprus, the lifting of the restrictions on Cyprus-flagged vessels and vessels serving the 
Cyprus trade), (2) the retrial of Abdullah Ocalan who is the leader of PKK, (3) the 
promotion of Kurdish Nationalism by the EU, (4) the change in electoral system (the 10 
percent threshold and the use of other languages rather than Turkish by political parties), 
(5) the changes on the Penal Code of Turkey, (6) the reopening of the Greek Orthodox Journal of Global and International Studies 
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Seminary, which has been closed since 1971, (7) the removing of the bans on public use 
of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch and the election of the heads of some 
religious minorities, (8) the recognition of some groups in Turkey as minorities such as 
Kurds and Alevis, (9) the opening of Turkey’s border with Armenia, (10) the recognition 
of so-called Armenian Genocide, (11) the legalizing of adultery, (12) the allowing of 
property sales to foreigners in Turkey and Northern Cyprus, and (13), the fear that 
European integration could erode national sovereignty and dilute Turkish-Islamic identity 
and culture (Arikan, 2004). 
In addition to these nationalism-based and religion based concerns about the EU’s 
policies with respect to Turkey’s domestic affairs, EU-skeptical political leaders also 
have concerns about the double standards of the EU toward Turkey. They believe that the 
EU is particularly tough on Turkey, and they suspect that whatever else Turkey 
accomplishes, European Union countries will not let Turkey join because of other 
member nations’ deeply engrained prejudices. Any of the political issues listed above, 
along with the complicating issues of in-group vs. out-group social identity and the 
peripheral status of the Felicity Party may serve to explain why the favorable decisions of 
the EU on two separate occasions did not decrease the Euro-skepticism of the elites of 
Turkey’s Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP.) 
    As we observed from the hypotheses testing, the two major events did not have 
any impact on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. Additionally, only the first 
event had an impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of the SP. This result 
showed that the SP may have been more concerned about nationalism-based issues 
throughout the duration of first event. The party made 133 nationalism-based statements 
before the first event and 199 after the first event. In general, the data analysis shows that 
the frequency of the SP’s negative EU-related statements increased because of the impact 
of the first event.  This first event, on December 17, 2004, provided the first indication 
for this peripheral party that the EU was not, in fact, an insincere supra-national unity 
(contrary to statements made by the SP party elite to that effect). Instead, this event 
proved that the EU is ready to open the door for Turkey when Turkey completes the EU’s 
outlined requirements. The declarations that this peripheral party continued to make 
about the EU were seemingly unfounded in light of the nature of the December 17 event. 
The December 17 decision from the EU also appeared to prove the success of Turkey’s 
existing government at that time and could have had an impact on the results of the 2007 
national election in favor of the current government. Knowing this, the Felicity Party 
might have wanted to overshadow the success of the existing government by increasing 
their SP’s own speeches on some sensitive nationalism-based issues, hoping that doing so 
might help to turn the public’s attention in different direction. As a result, I believe that 
the frequency of nationalism-based, negative statements made by the SP increased in this 
party’s discourses. The first and second events did not affect the overall Euro-skepticism 
of the SP in any way.  
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Policy Recommendations 
 
  The discussions about Euro-skepticism have recently attracted intense academic 
interest in both EU member and candidate countries. The dream of a “United States of 
Europe” has started to more seriously face the threat of Euro-skepticism. Euro-skepticism 
at first showed itself mostly in candidate countries but is also demonstrated in some EU 
member countries. Sir Anthony Eden’s often cited comment, from one of his speeches 
made in 1952 at Columbia University in New York, explains, for example, British Euro-
skepticism very well. He said simply, “British membership [in] a ‘federation on the 
continent of Europe’ was something ‘we know in our bones we cannot do’” (Young, 
1998, 73-74). Additionally, the opposition of France and the Netherlands in the 
ratification of referenda for the proposed EU constitution showed that the dream of being 
a “United States of Europe” would not come without problems. The EU began to realize 
that it is problematic to think that the European Union project might develop into the sort 
of federal state advocated by “eurofederalists” such as the former German foreign 
minister Herr Fischer because of the many differences among the member states with 
respect to language, culture, and historical background. Turkey’s possible membership 
only creates an additional, potentially complicating difference among member nations, 
with the possibility of bringing Islam to the EU (Christie, 2007). What then, would be the 
best way to help decrease Euro-skepticism in EU member and candidate countries?  
     I strongly believe that Christie’s (2007) modern-day Madisonian approach for the 
EU might be a good solution to decrease Euro-skepticism. By following Christie’s 
Madisonian approach, I would recommend that the EU focus its future efforts on two of 
the primary purposes of the original American Constitution. According to this approach, 
the EU should first promote economic growth through trade, a common currency, and the 
protection of private contractual and property rights. Second, the EU should leave the 
development of social welfare, domestic, and criminal policies to the individual states.  
  I believe that it is too early for EU to be the “United States of Europe.” As 
Christie indicates, the EU should not ignore the historical fact that it took a long time for 
13 original American colonies to become the United States of America, even though 
they, unlike EU member and candidate nations, “shared the same language (English), a 
common language and culture influenced by that religion (Protestant Christianity), 
common legal principles based on English law, and a common history as people who had 
fought and bled together against a common enemy for independence” (Christie, 2007). 
Even today, some issues in the US are matters of state, not federal, law. Problematically, 
the EU has continued to accept new members without giving enough time to test the 
harmony of all these states. It might well be a big mistake for the EU to approach 
membership issues by the Franco-German vision of “deeper and narrower” instead of 
choosing the British vision of “wider and shallower.” The Franco-German vision 
promotes the political integration of the EU as more important than expanding the free-
trade zone. On the other hand, the British vision promotes expanding the free-trade zone 
into as many countries as possible while preventing the evolution of the EU into a federal 
super-state. Once the “harmony test” can be accomplished by the states, then it will be 
more rational to work on the vision of “deeper and narrower” (Christie, 2005)  Journal of Global and International Studies 
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  As discussed above, if the EU leaves states free to make their own decisions on 
some issues, it will diminish Euro-skepticism and may get member states closer to 
accepting the idea of Europeanization or the “United States of Europe.” This could solve 
the problem and decrease Euro-skepticism in member countries such as France and 
Denmark and in candidate countries such as Turkey. This will also eliminate the concerns 
of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites on some sensitive nationalistic and religious 
issues. In addition to that, the EU must also help Turkey to understand the nature of the 
accession process better. This will alleviate concerns about double standards of the EU 
toward Turkey.  
  Finally, the EU needs to find a strategy to build trust in the Euro-skeptical Turkish 
people and in the hearts and minds of the Turkish elite, while stressing the aim of 
eventual Turkish membership. The EU must also realize that being “too tough on 
Turkey” will not solve the problem. On the contrary, being too tough will only serve 
reinforce Turkey’s view that the EU imposes double standards and will not admit Turkey 
no matter what Turkey does to seek membership.  
  In addition to the responsibilities of the EU to Turkey, Euro-skeptical Turkish 
elites also have serious responsibility for a betterment and modernization of Turkey. First 
of all, they must recognize that globalization transformed the world into a small village, 
and we all members of the world bear some responsibility for achieving peace in that 
village. The key to this peace is, among other things, better foreign policy. Turkey needs 
to be constructive. It should not be forgotten that selfishness, discrimination, anger, and 
prejudice towards other religions and nations have no place in foreign policy (TESEV, 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 
  Turkey held both parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007, and the result 
of the parliamentary elections might shape the future of EU-Turkey relations. The SP did 
not win the 2007 elections and still remains a peripheral party.  If, however, this 
peripheral party wins a future election and becomes a core party in the future, it will be 
interesting to revisit their stance regarding Turkey’s EU membership and relationship 
with Europe in general. If this study is replicated when the Felicity Party is more of a 
core party, and if the results show that the party’s Euro-skepticism has decreased and that 
it has become more supportive of the EU and the EU’s policies, then the findings of this 
study will also be confirmed.  This study can also be replicated on Euro-skeptical parties 
once Turkey has become an EU member. It will be very interesting to see how the Euro-
skeptical parties will be affected by that event and how they will react to the EU. 
 
Limitations of this Study 
 
  The main limitation of the study is its focus on only available data from the Pro-
SP Milli Gazete. In addition to the direct statements of these political elites, there were 
some indirect statements paraphrased by the news reporter. Even though the statements 
came from the political elite, there is always a risk that these paraphrased statements 
might have included the perception of the reporter, and there is no way for the researcher 
to confirm the accuracy of the statements without seeing a transcription of the original 
statement. 
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